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488 IN RE BELL. [19 C. (2d) 
[Crim. No. 4298. In Bank. Feb. 13, 1942.] 
In re RUFUS BELL et al., on Habeas Corpus. 
[la, Ib] Habeas Oorpus-Grounds for Relief-Unconstitutional 
Statute or Ordinance.-Haheas corpus is an appropriate rem-
edy by which one can procure a determination of the consti-
tutionality -of the statute or ordinance under which he has 
been convicted. It is the only remedy available for such pur-
pose where the remedy by appeal has been exhausted. While 
the trial courts have jurisdiction to determine the constihi-
tionality of the law in question, the writ lies, apart from any 
remedy by appeal, because of the importance of securing a 
correct determination of such question. 
[2] Id.-Existence of Other ReID.edy-Discretion.-The require-
ment of the exhaustion of all available remedies by appeal 
before invoking habeas corpus to test constitutionality is not 
mandatory; but since the granting of the writ results in the 
release of the petitioner whereas an appeal may result merely 
in a new trial with the exclusion of charges based on uncon-
stitutional . provisions or the inclusion of procedure constitu-
tionally guaranteed, the courts may in their discretion refuse 
to grant the writ prior to the exhaustion of the remedy by 
appeal. 
[3] Oriminal Law-Prohibition by Law-Sufficiency and Validity 
of Enactments.-A statute or 'ordinance prohibiting both con-
duct that may be prohibited and conduct that may not is too 
uncertain and vague to be enforced, and a cOllviction there-
under cannot stand even though the acts done could be validly 
prohibited by properly drafted legislation. It is not the func-
tion of the court to determine whether the restrictions imposed 
by the legislation can be validly applied to the facts of a par-
ticular case. 
[4] Labor - Offenses - Picketing Ordinance-Validity.-A provi-
sion of an ordinance making it a crime for "any person to 
[1] Habeas corpus to test the constitutionality of an ordinance, 
note, 32 A. L. R. 1054 .. See, also, 13 Oal. Jur. 217, 225, 230, 232; 
25 Am. Jur. 151, 164,170,174. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 8] Habeas Corpus, § 15; [2] Habeas 
Corpus, § 7; [3J Criminal Law, § 9; [4, 7J Labor, § 31; [5, 12] 
Labor, § 23; [6J Constitutional Law, § 64; [9] Habeas Corpus, 
§ 61; [10, 11] Habeas Corpus, § 62. 
WAYNE H·EA: 
ATTORNEY AT LAW ":. 
25 TAYLOR ST. GR 4.80!3& 
SAN FRANC)SCO 2. c.~',JF .. 
Feb. 1942.1 
IN RE BELL. 
[19 c. (2d) 488] 489 
loiter, stand, or sit upon any public highway, alley . . . so as 
to in any manner hinder or obstruct the free passage . . . of 
persons or vehicles," is unconstitutional since it embraces 
peaceful picketing and other acts that may not be prohibited. 
[5] Id.-Picketing-Peaceful Picketing.-The character of picket-
ing iIi the course of a labor dispute as being peaceful or other-
wise is determitled not by the existence of a threat but by 
what is actually threatened. Peaceful picketing involves be-
setting the premises of another for the purpose of inducing 
employees to quit their employment or dissuading ot hers from 
seeking employment. The fact that to some exton t compul-
sion, coercion, intimidation, or threats are employed does not 
detract from its peaceful nature so long as they constitute 
only -economic, moral, or social pressure. 
(6] Oonstitutional Law - Oonstitutionality of Statutes _ Partial 
UnconstitutionalitY-Separable Provisions.-When part of a 
statute is declared unconstitutional, the remainder will stand 
if it is complete in itself and would have been adopted by the 
legislature had it foreseen the partial invalidation of the stat-
ute. An ordinance prohibiting both peaceful picketing and 
picketing by acts of violence will be upheld so far as acts of 
violence are concerned where the valid part of the ordinance 
is complete in itself, and the ordinance contains a severance 
clause. 
(7] Labor-Offenses-Picketing Ordinance-Acts of Violence.-
While an ordinance is invalid if it makes illegal the same acts 
that are made illegal by the general laws of the state, an'ordi-
nance prohibiting picketing by acts of violence defines an 
offense different from general acts of violence unconnected 
with a labor controversy, and does not conflict with the laws 
relating to assault, battery, riot, disturbing the peace, and un-
lawful assemblage. ' 
[8] Habeas Oorpus-Grounds for Relief---Unconstitutional Statute 
or Ordinance-Partial InvaliditY.-Whereone petitioning for 
a writ of habeas corpus was convicted of violating an ordi-
nance in part invalid, pursuant toa complaint charging a 
public offense, and where the punishment imposed upon him 
is not excessive for violation of the valid portion of the ordi-
nance, he can be releal:led only if it is clear that he was not 
convicted of violating that provision. 
[9a, 9b] Id.-Hearing-Presumptions_Regularity of Judgment-
[6] See 5 Oal. Jur. 644; 11 Am. Jur. 834. 
[8] See 13 Oal. Jur. 235; 25 Am. Jur. 247. 
[9] "And/or," note, 118 A. L. R. 1367. See, also, 15 Oal. Jur. 
64, 503; 6 Oal. Jur. Ten-year'Supp. 611 ;25 Am~ Jur. 247. 
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Where Law in Part Invalid.-On habeas corpus, which is in 
the nature ofa collateral attack, the judgment attacked car· 
ries with it a presumption of regularity, but in the case 
of a justice's court judgment, the presumption applies only 
where the ;judgment affirmatively shows that the court has 
jurisdiction over the person and subject matter. The pre-
sumption is not conclusive. And where a complaint charged 
both in the conjunctive and disjunctive a violation of every 
provision of an ordinance in part invalid, and the verdict was 
guilty as charged, and it is impossible to determine from the 
record whether there was a conviction of a violation of the 
valid provisions of the law, the presumption of regularity 
casts upon the party seeking release on habeas corpus the 
burden of proving that the conviction was based upon the' 
unconstitutional provisions. 
[10] Id. - Hearing - Evidence. - A petitioner seeking a writ of 
habeas corpus. is not confir.ed to the record when attempting 
to sustain the burden of proving that his conviction was in 
violation of his constitutional rights. Such proceeding per-
mits an examination of the evidence introduced at the trial 
and adrlitior,al evidence bearing on the infringement of con-
stitutional rights,-not to pass upon the sufficiency of the evi-
dence to support the verdict, but to decide whether the verdict 
violates constitutional guaranties. (See Pen. Code, § 1484.) 
[11] Id.-Hearing-Evidence-Sufficiency-Nonconviction of Acts 
of Violence.-Ina habeas corpus proceeding to secure the re-
lease of petitioners convicted of violating an ordinance pro-
hibiting both peaceful picketing· and picketing by acts of vio-
lence, the burden of proving that they were not tried and con-
victed for acts of violence is not sustained where the evidence 
reveals that large groups of pickets forcefully stopped auto-
mobiles entering picketed premises and intimidated the occu-
pants. 
(12] Labor - Picketing-Acts of Violence-What Constitutes.-
While pickets in a labor dispute may bring themselves to no-
tice of persons entering the picketed premises, they may not 
forcibly stop autom<..11!1es and intimidate the occnpants by 
gathering in large numbers. Such action is forceful intimi-
dation. 
PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure release from 
custody. VV rit discharged. 
Andersen & Resner, George R. Andersen and Herbert Res-
ner for Petitioners. 
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Joseph L. Heenan, District Attorney (Yliba), and Erling 
S. Norby for Respondent. 
. TRAYNOR, J.-Petitioners, members of a labor union, 
while engaged in picketing certain ranches and orchards, 
were arrested and charged with violating sections 2 and 3 of 
an anti-picketing ordinance adopted by the Board of Super-
vis0rs of Yuba County in 1937. These sections read as fol-
lows: "Section 2. It is unlawful for any person to loiter, 
stand, or sit upon any public highway, alley, sidewalk or 
crosswalk so as to in any manner hinder or obstruct the free 
passage therein or thereon of persons or vehicles passing or 
attempting to pass along the same, or so as to in any manner 
annoy or molest persons passing along the same." 
"Section 3. It is unlawful for any persons to beset or 
picket the premises of another, or any approach thereto, where 
any person is elliployed or seeks employment, or any place or 
approach thereto where such employee or person seeking em-
phymcnt lodges or resides, for the purpose of inducing such 
empIr-yee or person seekIng employment, by means of com-
pulsion, coercion, intimidation, threats, acts of violence, or 
fear to quit his or hor empl0yment or to refrain from seeking 
or freely entoring intll employment." 
The complaint did not specify the acts of misconduct on 
the part of petitioners but followed the language of the ordi-
nance. It charged . petitioners in count 1 with violating any 
one "andl or" any other provision of section 2, and in count 
2, with violating anyone "andl or" any other provision of 
section 3. They were tried in the Justice's Court of Marys-
ville Township, County of. Yuba, found guilty "as charged 
in the complaint," and sentenced "on said conviction" to a 
fine of $500 or 6 months in jail. On appeal the superior court, 
the court of last resort in cases arising in a municipal or jus-
tice's court (Cal. Const., art. VI, sec. 5) unheld the constitu-
tionality of the ordinance and affirmed the conviction, but 
reduced the jail sentence to 3 months. Petitioners there-
after applied to the superior court for a writ of habeas corpus 
on the ground that the ordinance was unconstitutional. When 
that court denied the writ, petitioners renewed their appli-
cation in the District Court of Appeal, but the latter court 
also denied the writ and upheld the ordinance as constitu-
tional. Petitioners now ask this court for a writ of habeas 
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corpus, contending that the ordinance prohibits peaceful 
picketing and therefore abridges freedom of speech, press and 
assemblage in violation of the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
and article I, sections 9 and 10 of the Constitution of Cali-
fornia. 
[ia] A preliminary question is whether the constitutionality 
of an ordinance may be tested by application for a writ of ha-
beas corpus. Most jurisdictions permit such a use of habeas cor-
pus. (See cases collected in 25 Am. Jur. 164, sec 29; 13 Cal. 
J ur. 225, sec. 8; 39 L. R. A. 450; 32 A. L. R .. 1054.) They 
adhere to the theory, however, that habeas corpus can lie,. not 
to substitute for a writ of error, but only to test the juris-
diction of the trial court or to secure the release of person~ 
detained without judicial authorization or under a void pro 
ceeding. (See 25 Am. Jur. 151, sec. 13; 13 Cal. Jur. 217 j 
sec. 4; Ex parte Nielsen, 131 U. S. 176 [9 S. Ct. 672\ 
33 L. Ed. 118] ; I-Iarlan v. McGourin, 218 U. S. 442 [31 S. 
Ct. 44, 54 L. Ed. 1101]; Ex parte Moran, 144 Fed. 594 [75 
C. C. A. 396]; 1 Bailey, Habeas Corpus [1913], sec. 2, 30 
et seq.; 12 N. Y: L. Q. R. 525.) The theory and the practice 
are somewhat inconsistent. In order to reconcile them the 
courts have resorted to the artificial reasoning of Ex parte 
Siebold, 100 U. S. 371 [25 L. Ed. 717], that an unconstitu-
tional statute is actually not a statute, and that a trial court 
therefore has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of pro-
ceedings based upon such a statute. The unconstitutionality 
of a statute, however, is not a foregone conclusion but the 
very question at issue and it has traditionally been one that 
trial courts have jurisdiction to decide .. (See 39 L. R. A. 454.) 
State courts constantly make decisions regarding the validity 
of statutes under the Constitution of the United States, and 
the United States Supreme Court, which reviews their deter-
minations by writ of error, has expressly stated that they have 
jurisdiction in such cases. (See Robb v. Co-nnolly, 111 U. S. 
624 [4 S. Ct. 544, 28 L. Ed. 542].) If they lacked it the 
United States Supreme Court would be compelled to reverse 
the decision of a state court because of lack of jurisdiction 
without further inquiry into the merits of the case. (See 
JJ1ansfield O. & L. JJ1. R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U. S. 379 [4 S. Ct. 
510, 28 L. Ed. 462].) It has never been held that a decision 
holding a statute invalid is void because the statute itself 
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was void. ' 'Therefore, unless we adopt the peculiar theory 
that the court has jurisdiction to decide right, but not to 
decide wrong, we are driven to the conclusion that a decision 
is not void for lack of jurisdiction merely because it decides 
that an unconstitutional statute is valid." (39 L. R. A. 
454; see McGovney, Cases on Constitutiona1 Law [1st ed.], 
pp. 198-200.) 
A minority of courts, realizing the inconsistency between 
the practice of using habeas corpus to test constitutionality 
and the theory that it lies only to test jurisdiction, will not 
permit the question of constitutionality to be raised by 
habeas corpus. (See cases cited in 25 Am. Jur.; 39 L. R. A.; 
32 A. L. R., all supra.) There is, however, a less drastic solu-
tion. The courts can permit an independent review by habeas 
corpus of matters over which the trial court had jurisdiction, 
apart from any remedy by appeal, because it is warranted by 
the importance of securing a correct determination on the 
question of constitutionality. "It must never be forgotten 
that thew-rit of habeas corpus is the precious safeguard of 
personal liberty and there is no higher duty than to maintain 
it unimpaired .... the r:ule is not so inflexible that it may not 
yield to exceptional circumstances where the need for the 
remedy afforded by the writ of habeas corpus is apparent." 
(Chief Justice Hughes in Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U. S. 19, 
26, 27 [59 S. Ct. 442, 83 L. Ed. 455].) There are instances 
where habeas corpus affords the only method of testing consti-
tutionality as when a statute upheld as valid at the time of 
conviction is subsequently declared invalid in another case 
and in the interim the petj doner either exhausts his remedy 
by ap:t1eal or the time for taking an appeal expires. (Ex parte 
Lockhart, 25 Okla. Cr. 4~9 [221 Pac. 119]; In re Jarvis, 66 
Kan. 329 [71 Pac. 576].) In California only a writ of 
habeas corpus enables a higl]er court to decide the question of 
constitutionality in cases which, like the present one, arise in 
a justice's or municipal court and can be appealed only to 
the superior court. (See Ex parte Siebold, supra, involving a 
similar situation.) 
Habeas corpus is also widely used to test the constitution-
ality not only of a statute but of the procedure in petition-
er's trial, even though the trial court has jurisdiction to try 
the petitioner (see Ex parte N'ielsen, supra; 35 Columbo L. 
Rev. 404 at 412), and any infringement of constitutional right 
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during the trial may be raised on appeal. The federal CNuts 
have repeatedly held that habeas corpus lies if the accused 
has been deprived of such fundamental constitutional gilUran-
tees as the right to counsel (Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 
[58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461]; see Powell v. Alabama: 
287 U. S. 45 [53 S. Ct. 55, 77 L. Ed. 158, 84 A. L. R. 527] ), 
the right to a fair trial free frum mob violence (Moore v. 
Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86 [43 S. Ct. 265, 67 L. Ed. 543]) or 
free from the use of testimony known to the prosecution to 
be perjured (Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103, 105 [55 S. 
Ct. 340, 79 L. Ed. 791, 98 A. IJ. R. 406].) (See, also, Tumey v. 
Ohio, 273 U. S. 510 [47 S. Ct. 437, 71 L. Ed. 749], insuring 
the right to an impartial judge.) The federal Cou.rts regard 
these rights as SJ fundamentl.ll as to admit all additional spe-
cial procedure to insure their protection once the remedy in 
the state courts lS exhausteu (Mooney v. Holohan, supra), 
or is no longer available (Jvhnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 
[58 S. Ct. 1019,82 L. Ed. 1461].) 
There are other situati(.'lls in which habe.as corpus is used, 
not as a test of jurisdiction, but to review a question of 
law that cannot otherwise be raised or is so important as to 
render the ordinary procedure inadequate. Thus, it lies to 
test whether there is probable cause to justify thf> commit-
ting magistrate inholding petitioner for trial. (Pen. Code 
sec. 1487; Ex parte Willimns, 52 Cal. App. 566 [199 Pac. 
347] ; Application of Hartwell, 28 Cal. App. 627 [153 Pac. 
730] ; see, also, cases cited in 13 Cal. Jur. 230, sec. 12; 25 Am. 
Jur. 170, sec. 37.) There is no other method of securing a 
review of th~ magistrate's determination in this regard. 
(People v. Creeks, 170 Cal. 368 [149 Pac. 821] ; Ex· parte Wil~ 
liams, supra.) It also lies to test whether the complaint 
charges a ptlblic offense (Ex parte lFilliams, 121 Cal. 328 [53 
Pac. 706] ; Ex parte McNulty, 77 Cal. 1G4 [19 Pac. 237, 11 
Am. St. Rep. 257] ; People ex rel. Perkins v. Moss, 187 N. Y. 
410 [80 N. E. 3S3, 10 Ann. Cas, 309, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 528] ; 
see, also, 13 Cal. Jur. 232, sec. 14; 25 Am. Jur. 174, sec. 42; 
and 35 Columbo L. Rev. 850 at 862) even though this question 
falls within the jurisd1ction of the trial court anu may he 
raised on appeal. Certaln courts go so far as to permit the 
use of habeas corp"Gs before trial when the statute of limita-
tions has run uplln the offense charged. (United States V. 
Mathues, 27 Fed. (211) 137; 81.;e Ex parte rice, 5 Cal. App. 
153 [89 Pac. 983] ; People v. McGee, 1 Cal. (2<1) 611 [36 Pac. 
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(2d) 378]; People V. Hoffman, ] 32 Cal. App. 60 [22 Pac. 
(2d) 229] ; see 35 Colu:mh. L. Rev. 407.) 
[2] While a few courts require that all available remedies by 
appeal be exhausted before l1a1eas corpus can be invokeu to 
test constitutionality (~ce Qoto v. Lane, 265 U. S. 393 [44 
S. Ct. 525, 68 L. Ed. 1070]), most jurisdictions, including 
California, do not make the r'cquireI!"lCnt mandatory (see cases 
collected in 13 Cal. Jur. 225, sec. 8; 2·5 Am. Jur. 164, sec. 29), 
and even permit the issue of eonstitutionality to be raised by 
habeas corpus b~fore trial. (Ibid, Matter of Zany, 20 Cal. 
App. 3GO [129 Pac. 295]; Ex parte Royall, 117 U. S. 241 
[6 S. Ct. 734, 29 L. Ed. 868]; contra, Glasgow v. Moyer, 
225 U. S. 4:20 [32 S. Ct. 753, 56 L. Ed. 1147] ; Johnson V. 
Hoy, 227 U. S. 245 [33 S. Ct. 240, 57 L. Ed. 497].) Since 
the granting uf u writ of habeas corpus, however, results in 
the release of the petitioner, while reversal on appeal may 
result merclyin a new trial with the flxclusion of those charges 
found based on ullconstitutional enactments or the inclusion 
of that procedure found constitutio!lally guarantecd, the court 
may in its discretion refuse to grant the writ if the remedy 
by appeal is not exhausted. This rule, adopt~d by the federal 
courts (In reLancaster, 137 U. S. 393 [11 S. Ct. 117, 34 L. 
Ed. 713]; In re Chapman, 156 U. S. 211 [15 S. Ct. 331, 
39 L. Ed. 401] ; R~'ggins v. United St:dcs, 199 U. S. 547 [26 
S. Ct. 147, 50 L. Ed. 303]; United States v. Sing Tuck, 
194 U. S. 161 [24 S. Ct. 621, 48 L. Ed. 917]; Henry v. 
Henkel, 235 U. S. 219 [35 S. Ct. 54, 59L. Ed. 203]; see 
35 Columbo L. Hev. 404 at 412, 41l1), should also be followed 
by the courts of thjs st::l.te. 
[lb] In the present case petitioners, having exhausted their 
remedy by appeal, seek by habeas corpus to assert the invalidity 
of the ordinance as a whole. Habeas corpus is not merely 
the proper remedy under such circumstances but the only one 
that will enable this court to decide upon the constitutionality 
ofr·the ordinance. 
[3] The ordinance must be judged on its face to determine 
whether it unconstitutionally prohibits acts that fall within 
the category of peaceful picketing. (l lhornhill v. Alabama, 
310 U. S. 88 [60 S. Ct. 736, 84 L. Ed. 1093]; Carlson v. 
California, 310 U. S. 106 [60 S. Ct. 746, 84 L. Ed. 1104]; 
Hague v. C. I. 0., 307 U. S. 496, 518 [59 S. Ct. 954, 83 L. 
Ed. 1423] ; Schneider V. State, 308 U. S. 147, 162-165 [60 S. 
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Ct. 146, 84 L. Ed. 155] ; Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 451 
[58 S. Ct. 666, 82 L. Ed. 949]; Stromberg v. California, 
283 U. S. 359, 369, 370 [51 S. Ct. 532, 75 L. Ed. 1117]. 
See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 [51 S. Ct. 625, 75 L. 
Ed. 1357]; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 [6 S. Ct. 
1064, 30 L. Ed. 220].) If ce~tain of its provisions operate 
to prohibit peaceful picketing, they are invalid even though 
they also prohibit acts that may properly be made illegal. 
A penal statute that" does not aim specifically at evils within 
the allowable area of State control, but on the contrary, 
sweeps within its ambit other activities that in ordinary cir· 
cumstances constitute an exercise of freedom of speech or of 
the press ... lends itself to harsh and discriminatory enforce-
ment by local prosecuting officials, against particular groups 
deemed to merit their displeasure" and "results in a contin-
uous and pervasive restraint on all freedom of discussion that 
might reasonably be regarded as within its purview." (Thorn-
hill v. Alabama, supra at 97.) It is not the function of the 
court to determine whether the restrictions imposed by the 
legislation can be validly applied to the facts of a particular 
case. ' 'Proof of an abuse of power in the particular case has 
never been deemed a requisite for attack on the constitution-
ality of a statute purporting to license the dissemination of 
ideas." (Thornhill v. Alabama, supra at 97 ; Hague v. C. I. 0., 
supra)' Lovell v. Griffin, supra; Schneider v. State, supra.) 
Language prohibiting conduct that may be prohibited and 
conduct that may not affords no reasonably ascertainable stan-
dard of guilt and is therefore too uncertain and vague to be 
enforced. (Stromberg v. California, s~{,pra, 369-370; Herndon 
v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242, 261-263 [57 S. Ct. 732, 81 L. Ed. 
1066] ; Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451 [59 S. Ct. 
618, 83 L. Ed. 888]; De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353 [57 
S. Ct. 255, 81 L. Ed. 278]; Hague v. C. I. 0., supra; 
Schneider v. State, supra; In re Harder, 9 Cal. App. (2d) 
153, 155 [49 Pac. (2d) 304] ; Territory of Hawaii v. Anduha, 
48 Fed. (2d) 171.) A conviction based upon such a statute 
cannot stand even though the acts of misconduct in the par-
ticular case could be validly prohibited by properly drafted 
legislation. (Thornhill v. Alabama, supra; Carlson v. Cali-
fornia, supra.) 
[4] Section 2 of the present ordinance makes it a crime" for 
any person to loiter, stand, or sit upon any public highway, 
Feb. 1942.] IN RE BELL. 
[19 O. (2d) 488] 
497 
alley, sidewalk or crosswalk so as to in any manner hinder 
or obstruct the free passage ... of persons or vehicles ... ". 
This language encompasses conduct that is well within the 
bOllnds of peaceful picketing sanctioned by the guarantees of 
due process of law. Thus a picket may be peaceful even 
though he loiters, stands, or sits upon a public highway, alley, 
sidewalk, or crosswalk, and thereby constitutes to some extent 
an obstruction to the free passage of persons and vehicles or 
an annoyance to persons who do not approve of his presence. 
(See Thornhill v. Alabama, supra; Carlson v. California, 
supra; In re Harder, supra; Territory of HawaVi v. Anduha, 
supra; In re Williams, 158 Cal. 550 [111 Pac. 1035].) The 
sweeping prohibition of section 2 would apply equally against 
peaceful pickets, shoppers engrossed in a window display, 
invalids in wheelchairs,· acquaintanc~s who stand engaged in 
conversation. The entire section is therefore invalid even 
though Yuba County might validly prohibit excessive and un-
necessary obstruction 0.£ the streets and highways. 
[5] Section 3 of the ordinance likewise makes conduct gener-
ally recognized as peaceful picketing unlawful. Peaceful 
picketing in the course of a labor dispute involves besetting 
the premises of another for the purpose of inducing employees 
to quit their employment or dissuading others from seeking 
employment. The fact that to some extent compulsion, co-
ercion, intimidation, or threats are employed does not detract 
from its peaceful nature so long as they constitute only eco-
nomic,moral, or social pressure and not the pressure of vio-
lence. (See McKay v. Retail Automobile Salesmen's Local 
Union No. 1067, 16 Cal. (2d) 311 [106 Pac. (2d) 373] ; Park:. 
inson Co. v. Building Trades Council, 154 Cal. 581 [98 Pac. 
1027, 16 Ann. Cas. 1165, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 550; Lisse v. 
Local Union No. 31, 2 Cal. (2d) 312 [41 Pac. (2d) 314]; 
Pierce v. Stablemen's Union, 156 Cal. 70 [103 Pac. 324].) 
The character of the picketing js determined not by the 
existence of a threat but by what is actually threatened. 
(See dissenting opinion of Justice Holmes in Vegelahn v. 
Guntner, 167 Mass. 92 [44 N. E.I077, 57 Am. St. Rep. 443, 
35 L. R. A. 722].) A picket may point to the possibility of 
ousting from the union any employee crossing the picket line 
and thereby compel or coerce bim to quit his employment. The 
provisions of section 3 prohibiting such conduct are invalid. 
[6] That part of section 3, however, prohibiting picketing 
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by acts of violence is yalh.l, fur tlIt re is no crmstitutional sanc-
tion for violence in lahor Ui~~):ltcS. 'VIlCIl vart of a statute is 
declared uncollstituti()] wI, t1!c fl'l!1:lilldcr will st[md if it is 
complete in itself and woulU ]1.1Y(' IIe'cn adoptcd hy tho legisla-
tive body had the latter foreseen t~,c parlial invaliuation of the 
statute. (Ex parte Fra.zer, 54 Cnl. !.H:; 5 Cal. Jur. 614; Cooley, 
Constitutional Limitations (~th e.ll.) , vol. 1, p. 3GO.) Not 
only is the valid part of the present ordinance complete in 
itself, but the ordinance provides: "If any section, su bsec-
tion, sentence, clause or phrase of this ordinance is fur allY 
reason held to be unconstitutiollal or invalid, such (iccif..lon 
shall not affect the validity or eonstitutionality of the remain-
ing portions of this ordinance." (See Bacon Service (tori), v. 
Russ, 199 Cal. 21 [248 Pac. 235].) 
[7] The provisions of sect jon. 3 prohibiting picketin~ by acts 
of violence do not conflict with t.he general laws of tlll! state 
relating to assault, hattery, riot, !isturhing the peace, and 
unlawful assemblage. An ordinance is iIrvalicl if it lJlakes 
illegal the same acts that are made illegal by the general 1:1. ws 
of the state. (Cal. Canst., art. XI, sec. 11; Ex parte Sic, 73 
Cal. 142 [14 Pac. 405] ; In re Mingo, 190 Cal. 7GD [214 Pac. 
850] ; In re Mttrphy, 190 Cal. 2Ci6 [212 Pac. 30] ; Ex pl~rte 
Stephen, 114 Cal. 278 [46 Pac. b6] ; Ex l)llrte ])a'nicls, 183 
Cal. 63G [lU2 Pac. 442, 21 A. L. R. 1172].) Picketir:g by acts 
of violence, however, is an off.er .. se distinct from a~sault, bat-
tery, riot, disturbing the pea(>e, orun1awful assemblage, even 
though it may sometimes involve these acts. The nature , •. I a 
crime involving violence varies with the purpose for' wbieh 
the violence is employed. This or,1inance prohibits tbe use 
of violence for the purpose of preventing employees or pn.trvns 
from entering premises being picketc(~ in connection with n 
labor dispute. It therefore defines an offense different fron: 
general acts of violence unconnected with a 1abor controversy. 
[8] When a petitioner has been convicted of violating- a stat-
ute that is entirely unconstitutional, the court will ortl.inarily 
issue a writ of habeas corpus ,releasing him from custody. 
The present ordinance, however, contains a valid lJrovision 
prohibiting acts of violence. The complaint charges petition-
ers with picketing by acts of violence and therefore charges a 
public offense for such acts are not consistent with lawful 
action. (See cases cited in 13 Cal. Jur., pp. 235, 236, note 7; 
ct. Ex parte P~terson, 119 Cal. 578 [51 Pac. 859] ; Ex parte 
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McLaughlin, 16 Cal. App. 270 [116 Pac. 684]; In re Hernan-
dez, 64 Cal. App. 71 [220 Pac. 423] ; Ex parte Greenall, 153 
Cal. 767 [96 Pac. 804] ; In re AhSing, 156 Cal. 349 [104 Pac. 
448].) Since the punishment imposed on petitioners is not 
excessive for violation of the valid provision of the ordinance, 
they can be released by habeas corpus only if it is clear that 
they were not convicted of violating that provision. (Ex parte 
Morrison, 88 Cal. 112 [25 Pac. 1064].) 
[9a] The uncertainty surrounding their conviction arises 
. from the ambiguity of the complaint, which charged them with 
violating anyone" and/or" any other provision of the ordi-
nance, count 1 referring to section 2 and count 2 referring to 
section 3. Petitioners were in effect charged with violating 
all the provisions of each section of the ordinance or anyone 
provision of each section. They were found guilty "as 
charged" and sentenced "on said conviction." It cannot 
therefore be determined from the face of the record whether 
or not they were found guilty of violating the one valid pro-
vision of section 3. 
The expression "and/or", which made possible a conviction 
couched in such general terms, has met with widespread con-
demnation. (Oochrane v. Florida East Ooast Ry. 00., 107 Fla. 
431 [145 So. 217]; Preble v. Architectural Iron Workers 
Union, 260 Ill. App. 435; Tarjan v. National S~trety 00., 268 
Ill. App. 232; State v. Dudley, 159 La. 872 [106 So. 364] ; 
Russell v. Empire Storage &7 Ice 00., 332 Mo. 707 [59 S. W. 
(2d) 1061]; State v. Douglas, 339 Mo. 187 [95 S. W. (2d) 
1179] ; Drummond v. Oity of Oolumbus, 136 Neb. 87 [285 
N. W. 109, 286 N. W. 779] ; Kornbrodt v. Eqttitable Trust 
00.,137 Ore. 386 [2 Pac. (2d) 236, 3 Pac. (2d) 127] ; Allen 
v. State, 138 Tex. Cr. 303 [136 S. W. (2d) 232]; Oobb v. 
State, 139 Tex. Cr. 337 [139 S. W. (2d) 272] ; Putnam v. In-
dustrial Oommission, 80 Utah 187 [14 Pac. (2d) 973]; Em-
ployers' Mutual Liability Ins. 00. v. Tollefson, 219 Wjs. 434 
[263 N. W. 376] ; An And/Or Symposium, 18 A. B. A. J our-
nal 574; 18 A. B. A. Journal 456, 524 (editorials) ; 42 West Va. 
L. Q. 235; H. H. Parsons, And/Or, 10 Cal. State Bar, J. 89, 
cf. H. Mumper, Unfair Tirade Against the Symbol 
"And/Or", 10 Cal. State Bar. J.187.) It is true that the expres-
sion has proved convenient in contracts and other instruments 
where, by its intentional equivocation, it can anticipate alter-
native possibilities without the cumbersome itemization of each 
one. (118 A. L. R. 1.367; 43 Yale L. J. 918, 20 Marquette L. 
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Rev. 101.) It lends itself, however, as much to ambiguity as 
to brevity. rrhus it cannot intelligibly be used to fix the occur-
rence of past events. A purported conclusion that either one 
or both of two events occurred is a mere restatement of the 
problem, not a decision as to which event actually occurred. 
If a person is accu,sed of violating an unconstitutional as well 
as a constitutional provision of a statute and the verdict by 
the use of "and/or" declares him guilty of violating either 
one or both provisions, it is anopen question whether he is guilty 
of any punishable offense. The verdict in effect states that the 
accused is guilty or innocent of violating the constitutional pro-
vision. A comparable lack of precision was censured by the 
United States Supreme Court in Stromberg v. California, 283 
U. S. 359, 368 [51 S. Ct. 532, 75 L. Ed. 1117, 73 A. L. R. 
14.84] : "rrbe verdict against the appellant was a general one. It 
did not specify the ground upon which it rested. As there were 
three purposes set forth in the statute, and the jury was in-
structed that their verdict rpight be given with respect to any 
OTIC of them, independently considered, it is impossibl e to say 
under which clause of the statute the conviction was olJtained. 
If anyone of these clauses, which the state court has held to 
be separable, was invalid, it cannot be determined upon this 
record t.hat the appellant was not convicted under that clause. 
... It follows that instead of its being permissible to hold, 
with the state court, that the verdict could be sustained if 
anyone of the clauses of the statute were found to be valid, 
the necessary conclusion from the manner in which the case 
was sent to the jury is that, if any of the clauses in question 
is invalid under the Federal Constitution, the conviction can-
not be upheld. " The ambiguity of the judgment in the pres-
ent case would thus clearly warrant a reversal of the conviction 
on appeal or other direct attack. (See, also, People v.Moss, 
33 Cal. App. (2d) (Supp.), 763, 767 [87 Pac. (2d) 932] ; Peo-
ple v. Tomlinson, 35 Cal. 503, 508.) 
A habeas corpus proceeding, however, is in the nature of a 
collateral attack, and a judgment that is collaterally attacked 
carries with it a presumption of regularity. (Johnson v. 
Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 468 [58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461] ; 
see 1 Freeman, Judgments (5th ed.) 780, et seq.; 15 Cal. Jur. 
64, et seq.) This presumption of regularity applies to the pro-
ceedings of a justice's court only if the judgment affirmatively 
shows, as in the present case, that the court has jurisdiction over 
person and subject matter. (Brush v. Smith, 141 Cal. 466 [75 
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Pac. 55]; Hayward v. Pimental, 107 Cal. 386 [40 Pac. 545]; 
Rowley v. Howard, 23 Cal. 401, 404. See 15 Cal. Jur. 503; 6 Cal. 
Jur. Supp. 611.) The presumption, however, is not conclusive 
in a habeas corpus proceeding but places upon petitioners the 
burden of proving that their convictions were based not upon the 
constitutional but upon the unconstitutional provisions· of the 
ordinance. (Johnson v. Zerbst, supra.) Unless they can sustain 
this burden they must be considered as having been convicted of 
violating the valid provision relating to acts of violence, and the 
judgment must be upheld. . 
[10] A petitioner seeking habeas corpus, however, is not con-
fined to the face of the record in attempting to sustain the bur· 
den of proving that his conviction was in violation of his consti~ 
tutional rights. The courts of both the United States and Cali-
fornia have declared that the remedy of habeas corpus per-
mits an examination not only of the actual evidence intro-
duced at petitioner's trial but of any necessary additional evi-
dence bearing upon the infringement of petitioner's constitu-
tional rights. (Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86 [43 S. Ct. 
265, 67 L. Ed. 543] ; Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103 [55 
S. Ct. 340, 79 L. Ed. 791, 98 A. L.R. 406]; Herndon v. 
Lowry, 301 U. S. 242[57 S. Ct. 732, 81 L. Ed. 1066]; 
Johnson v. Zerbst, supra; In re Connor, 15 Cal. (2d) 161 [99 
Pac. (2d) 248]; In ,"e. Connolly, 16 Cal. App. (2d) 709 [61 
Pac. (2d) 490] ; In re Lake, 65 Cal. App. 420[224 Pac. 126] ; 
In re Chaus, 92 Cal. App. 384- [268 Pac. 422] ; see, also, Fiske 
v. Kansas, 274 U. S. 380 [47 S. Ct. 655, 71 L. Ed. 1108]; 
De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353 [57 S. Ct. 255, 81 L. Ed. 
278] ; Norris v. Alabama, 294U. S. 587 [55 S. Ct. 579, 79 
L. Ed. 1074]; Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 [53 S. Ct. 
55, 77 L. Ed. 158, 84 A. L. R. 527].) This examination is 
made, not to pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence. to sup-
port the verdict, but to determine what the verdict actually 
was, so that the court may decide whether it violates constitu-
tional guaranties. Such an examination will be made in a 
habeas corpus proceeding whenever a petitioner has been de· 
prived of due process of law, whatever form that deprivation 
has taken. If a court has no "jurisdiction" to enter a judg-
ment against a defendant after depriving him of such con-
stitutional guarantees as the right to counselor to a fair trial 
free from mob domination, it has no "jurisdiction" to enter 
a judgment against him based upon an unconstitutional stat-
ute. An examination of the facts is permissible to determine 
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whether a petitioner was denied due process of law with re-
spect to the procedure at his trial; it is no less permissible to 
determine whether he was denied due process of law by being 
convicted of violating unconstitutional legislation. 
In Herndon v. Lowry, supra, a defendant was convicted of 
the crime of attempting to incite an insurrection. On appeal· 
from a denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the 
United States Supreme Court examined the evidence intro-
duced at his trial, concluded that it revealed only conduct 
that was protected by the constitutional guarantee of free-
dom of speech, and held that his conviction under the statute 
was therefore a denial of due process of law requiring the 
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. 
In Johnson v. Zerbst, supra, a defendant petitioned for a 
writ of habeas corpus on the ground that he had been deprived 
of his constitutional right to be represented by counsel at his 
trial. The court held that petitioner was entitled to a release 
on habeas corpus if an examination of the facts supported his 
allegation, stating, "a prisoner in custody pursuant to the 
final judgment of a state court of criminal jurisdiction may 
have a judicial inquiry in a court of the United States into 
the very truth and substance of the causes of his detention, al-
though it may become necessary to look behind and beyond 
the record of his conviction. . . ." (p. 466.) 
In Moore v. Dempsey, supra, petitioners asked for release by 
habeas corpus on the grounds that they had been deprived of 
due process of law because of mob domination of their trial. 
The court held that the actual facts should be examined to 
determine the truth of the allegations. In Mooney v. Holo-
han, supra, the court stated that an examination must be made 
of facts outside the record to determine whether petitioner was 
deprived of due process of law at his trial. 
The cases of Fiske v. Kansas, supra; De J onge v. Oregon, 
supra; Norris v. Alabama; supra; and Powell v. Alabama, 
supra, all hold that an examination should be made of the 
evidence introduced in the trial court whenever it is essential 
to a proper determination of constitutional questions. While 
not involving writs of habeas corpus, these cases mark the ex-
tent of the protection afforded by constitutional guaranties 
and are therefore applicable to habeas corpus proceedings 
concerned with infringement of constitutional rights. In N or~ 
ris v. Alabama, supra, the court stated: "That the question 
is one of fact does not relieve us of the duty to determine 
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whether in truth a federal right has been denied. When a 
federal right has been specially set up and claimed in a state 
court, it is our province to inquire not merely whether it was 
denied in express terms but also whether it was denied in 
substance and effect. If this requires an examination of evi-
dence, that examination must be made. Otherwise, review by 
this Court would fail of its purpose in safeguarding constitu-
tionalrights. " 
The California cases are equally clear that on habeas corpus 
a court may examine the evidence introduced at the trial if 
necessary to determine properly the constitutional question 
at issue. In the case of In re Connor, S1.tpra, this court, fol-
lowing an application for a writ of habeas corpus, examined 
a transcript of statements made by petitioner at his arraign-
ment to determine whether he had been deprived of his con-
stitutional right to be represented by counsel at his trial. The 
court, treating the constitutional question as a jurisdictional 
one, stated: "Furthermore, the function of habeas corpus is 
to test the jurisdiction of the court to render judgment. It is 
not limited to the face of the proceeding, but extends to the 
record of the court below when necessary to determine juris-
diction." The District Court of Appeal in the case of In re 
Connelly, supra, declared: "But the respondent argues that 
the rule cannot be applied unless the fact of immunity ap-
pears on the face of the indictment. The argument is based 
upon the all-too-broad statement that the function of habeas 
corpus is limited to the question of jurisdiction as it appears 
on the face of the proceedings. The accepted rule in this state 
(and the only one applicable under the code sections cited 
above) is clearly stated in In re Lake, 65 Cal. App. 420, 423 
[224 Pac. 126], where the court says: ' ... While neither 
writ [habeas corpus or certiorari] is one of error, both extend 
to the entire record of the court below and to the evidence it-
self when necessary to determine jurisdiction.' " . Penal Code 
section 1484, moreover, provides that on habeas corpus pro-
ceedings the petitioner may "allege any fact to show either 
that his imprisonment or dete~tion is unlawful, or that he is 
entitled to his discharge. The court or judge must thereup0n 
proceed in a summary way to hear such proof as may be pro-
duced against such imprisonment or detention, or in favor of 
the same, and to dispose of such party as the justice of the 
case may require, and have full power and authority to re-
quire and compel the attendance of witnesses, by process or 
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subpoena and attachment, and to do and perform all other 
acts and things necessary to a full and fair hearing and de-
termination of the case." 
It is clear from the foregoing authorities that in a habeas 
corpus proceeding a court must look beyond the face of the 
record at the actual evidence when necessary to determine 
whether a petitioner has been deprived of constitutional rights. 
If the statute under which the petitioner was convicted is 
entirely unconstitutional, the court will discharge him on 
habeas corpus without examining the evidence. Conversely, 
if the statute is entirely constitutional, the conviction will be 
upheld without examination of the evidence. [9b] If, however, 
as in the present case, the statute is in part constitutional and 
in par;t unconstitutional and it cannot be determined from the 
eharge and conviction whether or not petitioner was tried and 
convicted for violating the va~id part, the court must exam-
ine the evidence, not to test whether it is sufficient to support 
a verdict, but to determine whether petitioner was tried and 
convicted for violating the invalid part alone, in which case 
the conviction must fall, or whether he was tried and con-
victed for violating the valid part as well, in which case the 
conviction must stand .. The petitioner has the burden of prov-
ing that he was not tried and convicted for violating the valid 
part of the statute. 
[11] Petitioners in the present case have failed to sustain 
the burden of proving that they were not tried and convicted for 
acts of violence since the transcripts of testimony at their 
trials reveal evidence of such acts. Some of the petitioners, 
along with 75 to 100 other men and women, were engaged 
in picketing the entrance to the Reed Ranch while others w.ere 
in a large group picketing the entrance to the DatoniOrchard. 
Witnesses testified that at the Reed Ranch a large group of 
pickets stood in the middle of the road and refused to move 
when automobiles approached, thus forcing the automobiles to 
stop. An officer testified that he could have driven on only if 
he "had wanted to kill somebody." Petitioners Bell, Davis 
and Walker participated in the stopping of cars. Bell was 
quoted as saying: "We are going to stop every damned auto-
mobile that comes in here." Davis, according to a witness, 
walked up and down the middle of the road giving orders "to 
stop every car that comes through here." Walker stated that 
"he was going to stop every damn automobile and to hell with 
the law. He would take care of them personally." Some of 
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the automobiles were permitted to go through after having 
been stopped but no automobile, other than one used by 
officers, passed through the blockade at the Reed Ranch before 
the arrival of two deputy sheriffs. 
The witness Newcomb testified that he was forced to stop 
at the Datoni Orchard about 3 :10 a. m. by a large group of 
men standing across the road waving flashlights. They gath-
ered about his car and ordered him to go back. A flashlight 
picture taken by a photographer at the scene shows seven-
teen men grouped about the car, eight of them directly in' 
front of it. The photographer testified that there were about 
65 men on the road and that Newcomb immediately turned 
around and left. Petitioners Knapp, Hamilton, Hinman, 
Wiseman, Day, and McKay were in this group and partici-
pated in the stopping of cars. Witnesses present at the Reed 
Ranch and the Datoni Orchard testified that the pickets' ac-
tion caused them to fear bodily harm. 
[12] This evidence reveals conduct exceeding the bounds 
of peaceful picketing. Pickets may bring themselves to the no-
tice of persons entering the picketed premises, but may not 
forcibly stop automobiles and intimidate the occupants by 
gathering in large numbers. Such action is more than peace-
ful persuasion. It is forceful intimidation and constitutes 
violence. 
Because petitioners have failed to sustain the burden of 
proving that they were not convicted of the one valid provi-
sion of the ordinance prohibiting acts of violence, the writ 
heretofore issued is discharged and the petitioners are re-
manded to the custody of the sheriff of Yuba County. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Houser, J., concurred. 
EDMONDS, J., Concurring.-Although I agree that the 
petitioners are not entitled to be released upon the writ of 
habeas corpus, the scope of the review, in my opinion, has 
been extended beyond that which the law allows. 
The petitioners were convicted under a complaint which 
charged them both in the conjunctive and disjunctive with 
the violation of each section of the ordinance. They now con-
tend that, since a conviction upon charges of peaceful picket-
ing would be an infringement of their constitutional rights, 
this court is not confined to the complaint and the judgment 
in considering the issues presented· in this proceeding but 
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may look behind the record of conviction and examine the 
evidence adduced at the trial to determine whether the con-
viction was for acts which are included within the unconsti-
tutional portions of the ordinance. This argument requires 
some consideration of the nature and function of the writ' of 
habeas corpus. 
Generally speaking, the scope of review on habeas corpus 
is limited to an examination of the jurisdiction of the court 
whose judgment of conviction is challenged. (Ex parte Parks, 
93 U. S. 18 [23 L. Ed. 787] ; Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S.371 
[25 L. Ed. 717]; Knewel v. Egan, 268 U. S. 442 [45 S. Ct. 
522, 69 L. Ed. 1036] ; Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U. S. 19 [59 
S. Ct. 442, 83 L. Ed. '455]; Ex parte Sternes, 77 Cal. 156 
[19 Pac. 275, 11 Am. St. Rep. 251] ; Ex parte Long, 114 Cal. 
159 [45 Pac. 1057] ; In re Oarpenter, 36 Cal. App. (2d) 274 
[97 Pac. (2d) 476].) The writ may not be employed as a 
vehicle for the correction of errors or irregularities com-
mitted within the exercise of an admitted jurisdiction. (Ex 
parte Olarke, 10.0 U. S. 399 [25 L. Ed. 715] ; Ex parte Siebold, 
supra; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 [58 S. Ct. 1019, 
82 L. Ed. 1461] ; 13 Cal. Jur. 218.) Nor may it be used as a 
device to test the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant the 
conviction of the petitioner, a question properly addressed to 
a reviewing court upon appeal. (Harlan v. McGourin. 218 
U. S. 442 [31 S. Ct. 44, 54 L. Ed. 1101]; In re Jacobs, 175 
Cal. 661 [166 Pac. 801] ; In re Willliams, 183 Oal. 11 [190 Pac. 
163J ; In re Stevenson, 187 Oal. 773 [204 Pac. 216] ; Ex parte 
Drew, 188 Oal. 717 [207 Pac. 249] ; 13 Oal. Jur. 219.) These 
are traditional and fundamental principles from which there 
has been no departure, and although in recent times the con-
cept of jurisdiction has been broadened upon habeas corpus, 
,the question of the guilt or innocence of the petitioner is 
never a proper subject of inquiry. 
Furthermore, a judgment challenged by a writ of habeas 
corpus carries with it a presumption of validity, and every 
reasonable intendment must be made in its favor. (Johnson v. 
Zerbst, supra, at p. 468; In re Pillsbury, 69 Cal. App. 784 
[232 Pac. 725] ; 15 Oal. Jur. 64.) The proceeding is subject 
to the rules applicable to collateral assault upon judgments 
generally. (In re Stevenson, supra; Ex parte Stephen, 114 
Oal. 278 [46 Pac. 86].) The presumption of validity, how-
ever, is rebuttable when the ~urisdiction of the convicting 
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court is called into question, and in pursuing its inquiry into 
the challenged jurisdiction, the petitioned court is not con-
fined to the face of the judgment of conviction but may review 
the entire proceeding below, including an examination not 
only of the facts disclosed by the record but of any additional 
facts, outside of, but not inconsistent with, the record. (Re 
Nielsen, 131 U. S. 176 [9 S. Ot. 672, 33 L. Ed. 118]; Re 
Ouddy, 131 U. S. 280 [9 S. Ot. 703, 33 L. Ed. 154J ; In re 
Mayfield, 141 U. S. 107 [11 S. ot. 939, 35 L. Ed. 635].) 
However, as to all matters not affecting the jurisdiction of 
the court, the presumption of regularity attaching to the judg-
ment of conviction is conclusive and unrebuttable, and any 
inquiry beyond the face of the judgment is foreclosed. To 
hold otherwise, would permit the writ of habeas corpus to be 
used as a means of correcting error or of testing the suffi-
ciency of the evidence. Accordingly, the presumption that 
petitioners were convicted under the constitutional portions 
of the picketing ordinance must be deemed conclusive and an 
examination of the evidence upon which that conviction was 
had is improper unless the jurisdiction of the justice's court 
has been adequately challenged by the allegations of the 
petition. 
As the courts have defined jurisdiction in recent years, it 
includes the right to hear . and determine concerning the 
offense charged and the authority of the court to act in a 
given manner over the person of the accused. (Fortenbury v. 
Superior Oourt, 16 Oal. (2d) 405 [106 Pac. (2d) 411].) 
If during the course of a criminal prosecution the ac-
,cused is deprived of certain fundamental procedural rights 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Oonstitu-
tion of the United States, a judgment of conviction subse-
quently entered is invalid for lack of jurisdiction. (J ohnson 
v. Zerbst, supra; Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U. S. 369 [61 S. Ct. 
572, 85 L. Ed. 859] ; In re Oonnor, 15 Oal. (2d) 161 [99 Pac. 
(2d) 248] [denial of the right to counsel] ; Frank v. Mangum, 
237 U. S. 309 [35 S. Ot. 582, 59 L. Ed. 969]; Moore v. 
Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86 [43 S. Ot. 265, 67 L. Ed. 543] [trial 
dominated by mob violence] ; Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510 
[47 S. Ct. 437, 71 L. Ed. 749] [denial of the right to an 
impartial judge].) The remedy of habeas corpus is available 
to a petitioner asserting a lack of jurisdiction in any of the 
respects above set forth, and the petitioned court may look 
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from under which clause of section 647 the conviction was 
had. In discharging the writ, the court declared, "we can-
not assume; for the purpose of passing on this question, or of 
discharging the prisoner, that this is the particular clause 
under which the judgment of conviction was had." And in 
In re Dal Porte, 198 Cal. 216 [244 Pac. 355], petitioner was 
charged and convicted under two counts, one of which stated 
an offense beyond the jurisdiction of the court to try. As the 
finding of guilt was general, it was impossible to ascertain 
whether the conviction was based upon either or both counts. 
Admitting that the judgment was erroneous and subject to 
correction on appeal, the court nevertheless declared: "We 
are not prepared to say, however, that petitioner is entitled 
in this proceeding to any relief from said judgment on account 
of its being based upon a defective count of the complaint. 
As we have already seen, the charge set forth in the second 
count of said complaint was one within the jurisdiction of 
said police court, and the fact that the offense charged in 
the first count of said complaint was one over which said 
police court did not have jurisdiction would not be sufficient 
to oust the court of jurisdiction of the offense over which it 
had full and complete jurisdiction." . 
But I agree that if the records of the trials which resulted 
in the petitioners' conviction may be examined for the pur-
pose of determining whether the petitioners committed acts 
of violence and physical intimidation, there is substantial 
evidence to support the judgments which are attacked in this 
proceeding. For although labor may present its grievances 
to the public, the obstruction of access to an employer's place 
of business by such number of persons as to require his em-
ployees who desire to work to run'the gauntlet under threats 
of physical harm is not protected by the constitutional guar-
anties. 
Many years ago, this court held that an intentional inter-
ference with the relations of an employer and his employees 
is not tortious if the object sought to be attained has reason-
able relevance to labor conditions and peaceful means are 
used to accomplish it. (Parkinson 00. v. B-uilding Trades 
Council, 154 Cal. 581 [98 Pac. 1027, 16 Ann. Cas. 1165,21 
L. R. A. (N. S.) 550].) That principle was recently restated 
and applied in holding "that workmen may associate to-
gether and exert various forms of economic pressure upon 
I..' ~ I ", _ .,.. ", • i . 
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employers, provided they act peaceably and honestly. " How-
ever, the court laid particular emphasis upon the requirement 
that labor's acts must be peaceful if they are to come within 
the protection of the law. Fully recognizing "that the right 
to picket peacefully and truthfully is one of organized labor's 
lawful means of advertising its grievances to the public, and 
as such is guaranteed by the Constitution as an incident of 
freedom of speech," it also added: "But the law clearly re-
quires that concerted action by union workers must be peace-
ful. Acts of violence or 'acts amounting to physical intimi-
dation' will be enjoined." (McKay v. Retail Auto S. L. 
Union No. 1067, 16 Cal. (2d) 311 [106 Pac. (2d) 373].) 
The testimony which is referred to in the opinion of my 
associates, and other evidence which is shown by the record, 
fully justifies a conclusion that the picketing, carried on, in 
part, under cover of darkness and with a show of force 
toward employees of the Earl Fruit Co. who desired to con-
tinue their employment entirely out of proportion to any 
peaceful purpose, was accompanied by such violence, or 
threats of violence, as to constitute unlawful means. To say 
that it comes within the bounds of peaceful picketing is to 
ignore the realities of the situation. 
When pickets patrol the public street which is the approach 
to their employer's premises and either their number .or their 
conduct is such as to constitute intimidation and put em-
ployees or others in fear of bodily harm, they are guilty of 
unlawful acts. Such picketing goes far beyond that which 
has been recognized by the courts as a reasonable exercise of 
the right to· tell the facts of a labor dispute and to persuade 
employees, by peaceful means, to leave their work. The courts 
have generally recognized that persuasion in the presence of 
a large number of persons is not peaceful persuasion, and in 
one of its decisions, the Supreme Court of the United States 
said that it is the proper function of a court of equity "to 
prevent the inevitable intimidation of ... groups of pickets, 
but to allow missionaries .... In going to and from work, 
men have a right to as free passage without obstruction as 
the streets afford, consistent with the right of others to enjoy 
the same privilege." (American Steel Foundries v. Tri-Oity 
Oentral Trades Oouncil, 257 U. S. 184 [42 S. Ct. 72, 66 
L. Ed. 189].) 
In the very recent case of Milk WagOtn Drive'!'s Uniop. III 
Ohicago, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U. S. 28"1 
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[61 S. Ct. 552, 85 L. Ed. 836, 132 A. L. R. 1200], (rehear-
ing denied, 312 U. S. 715 [61 S. Ct. 803, 85 L. Ed. 1145]), 
the same court laid down the requirement that, to be lawful, 
picketing must be peaceful and may not have a background 
of violence. "Peaceful picketing," said the court, "is the 
workingman's means of communication. It must never be 
forgotten, however, that the Bill of Rights was the child of 
the Enlightenment. Back of the guarantee of free speech lay 
faith in the power of an appeal to reason by all the peaceful 
means for gaining access to the mind. It was in order to 
avert force and explosions due to restrictions upon ration'al 
modes of communication that the guarantee of free speech 
was given a generous scope. But utterance in a context of 
violence can lose its significance as an appeal to reason and 
become part of an instrument of force. Such utterance was 
not meant to be sheltered by the Constitution." 
The petitioners in that case,as in the one now before this 
court, relied upon the decision of Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 
U. S. 88, 105 [60 S. Ct. 736, 84 L. Ed. 1093]. But, as 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter pointed out, there. was no "entangle-
ment with violence" in either the Thornhill case or in Carlson 
v. California, 310 U. S. 106 [60 S. Ct. 746, 84 L. Ed. 1104], 
where the court declared: "The power and duty of the State 
to take adequate steps to preserve the peace and protect the 
privacy, the lives, and the property of its residents cannot 
be doubted." Concerning the former case, he said that the 
court expressly excluded a labor dispute involving violence 
from the scope of its decision in these words: "Weare not 
now concerned with picketing en masse or otherwise con-
ducted which might occasion such imminent and aggravated 
danger ... as to justify a statute narrowly drawn to cover 
the precise situation giving rise -to the danger." The Yuba 
County ordinance, in so far as its valid severable provisions 
are concerned, is exactly such a statute. 
Curtis, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J., dissenting.-I dissent. 
In my opinion petitioners are entitled to their release on 
habeas corpus upon the ground that the provisions of the 
ordinance under which they were charged and convicted are 
unconstitutional and void. 
Since the majority of the court seem to agree that section 2 
of the ordinance is invalid, but sustain the validity of the 
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judgment of conviction against the petitioners under Sec-
tion 3 of said ordinance, . I will confine my discussion to sec-
tion 3 only. 
Said section provides: "Section 3. It is unlawful for any 
person to beset or picket the premises of another, or any 
approach thereto, where any person is employed or seeks 
employment, or any place or approach thereto where such 
employee or person seeking employment lodges or resides, for 
the purpose of inducing such employee or person seeking 
employment, by means of compulsion, coercion, intimidation, 
threats, acts of violence, or fear, to quit his or her employ-
ment or to refrain from seeking or freely entering into em-
ployment. " 
In my opinion the above-quoted section is so vague, in-
definite and uncertain that it cannot be said to denounce as 
a crime any act which may be proscribed under the police 
power of the state, and fails to provide a sufficiently ascertain-
able standard of guilt. 
Before making an analysis of the above-quoted section, I 
shall call attention to certain rules applicable to the inter-
pretation of statutes and ordinances. They are as follows: 
"When the language' of an act appears on its face to have 
a meaning, but it is impossible to give it any precise or in-
telligible application in the circumstances under which it was 
intended to operate, it is simply void; for if no judicial cer-
tainty can be settled upon as to its meaning, courts are not 
at liberty to supply the deficiency or make the statute certain. 
But legislation cannot be nullified on the ground of uncer-
tainty, if susceptible of any reasonable construction that will 
support it." (26 Am. and Eng. Ency. Law, 2d Ed., 656.) 
"Where the statutory terms are of such uncertain meaning, 
or so confused, that the courts cannot discern with reasonable. 
certainty what is intended, they will pronounce the enact-
ment void." (Statutory Crimes, 3d Ed., in the third sub-
division of section 41.) 
"Statutes and ordinances which fix crimes, or quasi crimes, 
should so fix them that there could be no uncertainty. They 
should be so worded that one could read them, and know 
whether or not he was violating law. They should not be so 
worded as to leave their substantive elements to the caprices 
of either judge or jury. In other words the law should be 
complete and definite. What would be 'reasonable effort' 
under this law is left a question for the court or jury. What 
19 O. (2d)-17 
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in the minds of one court or jury might be 'reasonable effort' 
might not be so considered by another court or jury. Each 
trial tribunal would be making its own ordinance. This will 
not do for a law or ordinance criminal in character." (Taft 
v. Shaw, 284 Mo. 531 [225 S. W. 457].) 
"It is equally true that a mere collection of words can not 
constitute a law; otherwise the dictionary can be transformed 
into a statute by the proper legislative formula. An act of 
the legislature, to be enforceable as a law, must prescribe a 
rule of action, and such rule must be intelligibly expressed." 
(St·ate ex info Crow V. West Side Street Ry. Co., 146 Mo. 155 
[47 S. W. 959].) 
"An ordinance of a regulatory nature must be clear, cer-. 
tain and definite, so that the average man may with due care 
after reading the same understand whether he will incur a. 
penalty for his actions or not." (19 R. O. L., p. 810.) 
". . . in creating an offence the legislature may define it 
by a particular description of the act or acts constituting it, 
or may define it as any act which produces, or is reasonably 
calculated to produce certain defined or described results." 
(8 R. O. L., p. 57.) 
Applying the foregoing rules to the ordinance under con-
sideration, it is clear to my mind that the language contained 
therein is insufficient to charge an offense within the pur-
view of the police power of the state in view of the recent 
decisions of the Supreme Oourt of the United States holding 
that "The freedom of speech and of the press, which are 
secured by the First Amendment against abridgment by the 
United States, are among the fundamental persona,! rights 
and liberties which are secured to all persons by the Four-
teenth Amendment against abridgment by a state. . . ." 
(Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 [60 S. Ot. 736, 84 
L. Ed. 1093]; Oarlson v. California, 310 U. S. 106 [60 S-
Ct. 746, 84 L. Ed. 1104J ; Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 [58 
S. Ct. 666, 82 L. Ed. 949]; Schneider V. State, 308 U. S. 
147 [60 S. Ct. 146, 84 L; Ed. 155] ; Gitlow v. New York, 268 
U. S. 652, 666 [45 S. Ct. 625, 69 L. Ed. 1138, 1145] ; Strom-
berg V. California, 283 U. S. 359, 368 [51 S. Ct. 532, 75 L. Ed. 
1117, 1121, 73 A. L. R. 1484] ; Near V. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 
707 [51 S. Ct. 625, 75 L. Ed. 1357, 1362]; Grosjean v. 
American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 244 [56 S. Ct. 444, 80 
L. Ed. 660, 665]; De J onge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, 364 
[57 S. Ct. 255, 81 L. Ed. 278, 283]._ See, also, Palko v. 
Feb. 194'2.] IN RE BELL. 
[19 C. (2d) 488] 515 
Oonnecticut, decided December 6, 1937 [302 U. S. 319, 58 
S. Ct. 149, 82 L. Ed. 288].) It is also well settled that 
municipal ordinances adopted under state authority consti-
tute state action and are within the prohibition of the amend-
ment. (Raymond v. Chicago Union Traction Co., 207 U. S. 
20 [28 S. Ct. 7, 52 L. Ed. 78, 12 Ann. Cas. 757] ; Home 
Teleph. & Teleg. 00. v. Los Angeles, 227 U. S. 278 [33 S. 
Ct. 312, 57 L. Ed. 510] ; O~tyahoga River Power Co. v. Akron, 
240 U. S. 462 [36 S. Ct. 402, 60 L. Ed. 743].) 
The terms, "bes:et or picket" are not defined in the ordi-
nance here under consideration nor in any statute or court 
decision of this state. (Oarlson v. California, supra.) Text-
writers have defined picketing as "the marching to and fro 
before the premises of an establishment involved in a dispute, 
generally accompanied by the carrying and display of a sign, 
placard or banner bearing· statements in connection with the 
dispute. " (Section 109 Labor Disputes and Collective Bar-
gaining by Ludwig Teller.) Picketing has also been defined 
by legislative enactment elsewhere as "the act of walking up 
and down before any place of business . . . and the solicita-
tion of the public or employees through word of mouth or by 
printed signs or banners, that such place of business is unfair 
to organized labor or to any voluntary association, group or 
members of labor organizations; and by requesting through 
word of mouth or signs that such place of business or em-
ployer be boycotted and not patronized by the public; and 
by personal solicitation through word of mouth or signs that 
employees . . . cease working in such place of business so 
picketed." (Diemer V. Weiss, 343 (Mo.) 626 [122 S. W. (2d) 
922].) In brief terms, picketing may be said to constitute 
the dissemination of information concerning the. facts of a 
labor dispute by representatives of organized labor in the 
vicinity of the place where the dispute exists. (Thornhill 
v. Alabama, supra.) 
It now appears to be well settled by both the decisions of 
this court and those of the Supreme Court of the United 
States that "the dissemination of information concerning the 
facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within that area 
of free discussion that is guaranteed by the Constitution." 
(Thornhill v. Alabama, supra; Oarlson V. California, supra; 
Hague v. C. I. 0., 307 U. S. 496 [59 S. Ct. 954, 83 L.Ed .. 
1423J; Schneider v. State, Sup1'a; Senn v. T1:le Layers Pr'o-
tective Union, 301 U. S. 468 [57 S. Ct. 857, 81 L. Ed. 1229].) 
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Applying the foregoing definition to section 3 of the ordi-
nance under consideration here, we find that the ordinance 
makes it "unlawful for any person to . . . picket the prem-
ises of another . . . for the purpose of inducing any employee 
or person seeking employment ... to quit his or her em-
ployment or to refrain from seeking or freely entering into 
employment. " 
It appears to be conceded that a statutory enactment 
couched in the above-quoted language would constitute a clear 
violation of the constitutional provisions both of this state 
and of the United States guaranteeing such civil liberties as 
freedom of speech, freedom of press and freedom of assem.,. 
bly. (Thornhill v. Alabama, supra; Carlson v. CaUfornia, 
supra; Lovell v. Griffin, supra; Schneider v. Bta·te, supra.) 
But it is insisted that the insertion of the words "by means 
of compulsion, coercion, intimidation, threats, acts of vio-
lence, or fear," after the clause" for the purpose of inducing 
such employee or person seeking employment," and before 
the clause "to quit his or her employment or to refrain from 
seeking or freely entering into employment" removes sec-
tion 3 of said ordinance from the category of unconstitu-
tional legislation and renders it a valid enactment prohibit-
ing all picketing where some of the pickets in some manner or 
other resort to what might be construed to mean" compulsion, 
coercion, intimidation, threats, acts of violence, or fear." In 
view of this argument, let us analyze the last quoted terms 
and see if they have any significance whatever when used in 
an ordinance designed to proscribe and prohibit acts and con-
duct which may be performed in the exercise of one's civil 
liberties guaranteed by both our state and federal Consti-
tutions. 
If picketing constitutes the publicizing of the facts concern-
ing a labor dispute in the vicinity of the premises where said 
dispute exists, then it must follow that it was the intention 
of the legislative body which enacted said ordinance to pro-
hibit the dissemination of information concerning such labor 
dispute by means of "compulsion," etc. 
In my opinion this is the only interpretation or construc-
tion which can be placed upon the above-quoted language of 
section 3 of said ordinance and said language is thereby 
rendered meaningless. To illustrate, how can it be said that 
a picket disseminated information concerning the facts of a 
labor dispute by means of "compulsion," or "coercion," or 
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"intimidation," or "threats," or "acts of violence," or 
"fear" ? Certainly the dissemination of information by 
means' of either the spoken or printed word regardless of how 
loud the voice or how large the printing would not have the 
effect of creating or bringing about the conditions described 
as "compulsion, coercion, intimidation, threats, acts of vio-
lence, or' fear. ' , At least, it is not possible for me to imagine 
a situation in which one engaged in picketing in the sense 
that that term has been defined, doing anything as a picket 
which would bring about a condition approaching" compul-
sion, coercion, intimidation, threats, acts of violence, or fear." 
Picketing does not mean throwing stones; but a person en. 
gaged in picketing may throw stones; picketing does not mean 
wielding clubs, but a person engaged in picketing may wield 
a club; picketing does not mean firing guns, but a person 
engaged in picketing may fire a gun; in brief, picketing does 
not mean or comprehend the commission of any act or acts 
of violence, but such acts may be committed by those engaged 
in picketing. It must be conceded that every act of violence 
designed to injure the person or property of another now 
constitutes a violation 'of some penal provision of the law.of 
this state and subjects the perpetrator thereof to prosecution 
and punishment, whether committed bya person engaged in 
picketing' or in any other activity. There is no more reason 
for saying that publicizing the facts of a labor dispute, ('r 
the dissemination of information concerning the facts of a 
labor dispute through pickets, may be accomplished by means 
of acts of violence, than to say that preaching the gospel, lec-
turing on social reforms, teaching political economy or pub-
lishing a newspaper may be likewise accomplished. The fact 
that acts of violence may be committed by one engaged in 
any of the above pursuits does not change the character of 
the pursuit nor subject it to restrictions created by legislative 
enactments under an asserted exercise of the police power. In 
other words, it· is the acts of violence which come within the 
purview of the police power and not the picketing, preaching, 
lecturing, teaching or publishing, because acts of violence 
have no relation to the purpose and object to be accomplished 
by any of the above-mentioned activities, including picketing, 
according to the accepted definition of that word. It may be 
true that a person while engaged in picketing might commit 
any and every crime known to our law, but certainly the 
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commission of such crimes should not be charged up against 
the entire picket line or the labor organization under whose 
auspices the premises are being picketed. As I read our penal 
statutes, I cannot think of anything in the nature of violence, 
threats of violence, or acts of violence which are not now de-
nounced as public offenses and punishable as such. Therefore, 
to enact an ordinance denouncing the dissemination of infor-
mation concerning the facts of a labor dispute by means of 
acts of violence, places such ordinance in the category of 
those denounced by the above-quoted rules as being so vague, 
indefinite and uncertain that they are absolutely meaningless. 
Such, in my opinion, is the situation with reference to section 
3 of the ordinance here under consideration. To carry the 
discussion a little further in order to disclose the absurdity 
of the contention that since section 3 of said ordinance pro-
hibits "picketing by means of acts of violence" it is a valid 
exercise of the police power of the state, let us assume that the 
ordinance denounced as a crime any of the following: 
, 'preaching by means of acts of violence"; or "lecturing by 
means of acts of violence"; or "teaching by means of acts 
of violence"; or "publishing a newspaper by means of acts 
of violence"; or "distributing a newspaper by means of acts 
of violence"; or "parading by means of acts of violence." 
Obviously, any such ordinance would be declared void on its 
face as being too vague, uncertain and indefinite to consti-
tute a public offense. The Supreme Court of Missouri by 
unanimous opinion in the case of Deimer v. Weiss, supra, de-
clared a similar ordinance void for uncertainty, and I have 
not been able to find respectable authority to the contrary. 
The ordinance here under consideration falls squarely 
within the rule announced by the Supreme Court of the 
United States in the case of Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242 
[57 S. Ct. 732, 81 L. Ed. 1066], where a statute of the state 
of Georgia purporting to prohibit acts and conduct tending 
to incite insurrection was under attack. It appears from the 
opinion in that case that "The petition alleged the judgment 
and sentence were void and appellant's detention illegal be-
cause the statute under which he was convicted denies and 
illegally restrains his freedom of speech and of assembly 
and is too vague and indefinite to provide a sufficiently ascer-
tainable standard of guilt, and further alleged that there had 
been no adjudication by any court of the constitutional valid-
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ity of the statute as applied to appellant's conduct." (Em-
phasis added.) The court at page 255 of its opinion said: 
"The affirmance of conviction upon the trial record neces-
sarily gives § 56 the construction that one who seeks mem-
bers for or attempts to organize a local unit of a party which 
has the purposes and objects disclosed by the documents in 
evidence may be found guilty of an attempt to incite insur-
rection. 
"The questions are whether this construction and applica-
tion of the statute deprives the accused of the right of free- ' 
dom of speech and of assembly guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and whether the statute so construed and ap-
plied furnishes a reasonably definite and ascertainable ,stand-
dard o/guilt." (Emphasis added.) 
On page 263 of its opinion in the Herndon case the court 
quotes with approval from its decision in United States v. 
L. Oohen Grocery 00., 255 U. S. at page 81 [41 S. Ct. 298, 
65 L. Ed. 516], the following pertinent declaration: 
" 'Observe that the section forbids no specific or definite 
act. It confines the subject-matter of the investigatic;m which 
it authorizes to no element essentially inhering in the trans-
action as to which it provides. It leaves open, therefore, the 
widest conceivable inquiry, the scope of which no one can 
foresee and the result of which no one can foreshadow or 
adequately guard against. In fact, we see no reason to doubt 
the soundness of the observation of the court below, in its 
opinion, to the effect that, to attempt to enforce the section 
would be the exact equivalent of an effort to carry out a 
statute which in terms merely penalized and punished all acts 
detrimental to the public interest when unjust and unreason-
able in the estimation of the court and jury ... ' (p. 89.) " 
The court then concluded: 
"The decisions relied on by the State held the Sherman 
Law furnished a reasonable standard of guilt because it made 
a standard long recognized by the common law the statutory 
test. 
"The statute, as construed and applied, amounts merely 
to a dragnet which may enmesh anyone who agitates for a 
change of government if a jury can be persuaded that he 
ought to have foreseen his words would have some effect in 
the future conduct of others. No reasonably ascertainable 
standard of guilt is prescribed. So vague and indeterminate 
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are the boundaries thus set to the freedom or speech a.ml 
assembly that the law necessarily violates the guarantees of 
liberty embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment." (Italics 
added.) 
What is the ascertainable standard of guilt prescribed in 
the ordinance here under consideration ~ The obvious answer 
to this question must be that it contains no such standard. 
The statement therein that "it shall be unlawful" to commit 
an "act of violence" amounts to nothing more than to say 
that" it is unlawful to do an unlawful act" without defining 
what constitutes the unlawful act. Nowhere in the ordinance 
is there any indication of what is meant by the expression 
"It is unlawful for any person to beset or picket the prem-
ises of another ... for the purpose of inducing such employee 
or person seeking employment, by means of compulsion, co-
ercion, intimidation, threats, acts of violence, or fear, to quit 
his or her employment or to refrain from seeking or freely 
entering into employment." It is obvious that if we apply 
the accepted definition of the word "picket" (to disseminate 
information concerning or to publicize the facts of a labor 
dispute) the italicized words become meaningless and no crime 
is defined. 
The Supreme Court of the United States in the case of 
Thornhill v. Alabama, supra, in commenting upon similar 
broad and sweeping provisions of an Alabama statute, made 
the following comment: 
"The numerous forms of conduct proscribed by section 3448 
are subsumed under two offenses: the first embraces the activ-
ities of all who 'without just cause or legal excuse' 'go near 
to or loiter about the premises' of any person engaged in a 
lawful business for the purpose of influenCing or inducing 
others to adopt any of certain enumerated courses of action; 
the second, all who 'picket' the place of business of any such 
person 'for the purpose of hindering, delaying or interfering 
with or injuring any lawful business or enterprise of an-
other.' It is apparent that one or the other of the offenses 
comprehends every practicable method whereby the facts of a 
labor dispute may be publicized in the vicinity of the place 
of business of an employer. The phrase 'without just cause 
or legal excuse' does not in any effective manner restrict the 
breadth of the regulation; the words themselves have no 
ascertainable meaning either inherent or historical. Compare 
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Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451, 453-455 [59 S. Ct. 
618, 83 L. Ed. 888]. The courses of action, listed under the 
first offense, which an accused-including an employee.,.-may 
not urge others to take, comprehends those· which in many 
instances would normally result from merely publicizing, 
without annoyance or threat of any kind, the facts of a labor 
dispute. An intention to hinder, delay or interfere with a 
lawful business, which is an element of the second offense, 
likewise can be proved merely by showing that others reacted 
in a way normally expectable of some upon learning the facts 
of a dispute. The vague contours of the term 'picket' are 
nowhere delineated. Employees or others, accordingly, may 
be found to be within the purview of the term and convicted 
for engaging in activities identical with those proscribed by 
the first offense. In sum, whatever the means used to pub-
licize the facts of a labor dispute, whether by printed sign, 
by pamphlet, by word of mouth or otherwise, all such activity 
without exception is within the inclusive prohibition of the 
statute so long as it OCcurs in the vicinity of the scene of the 
dispute." (Italics added.) 
Likewise,· in the case of Oarlson v. Oalifornia, supra, the 
Supreme Court of the United States in striking down as un-
constitutional and void an ordinance of Shasta County, Cali-
fornia, similar to the ordinance here under consideration be-
cause of its" sweeping and inexact terms," made this very 
pertinent declaration: 
"The sweeping and inexact terms of the ordinance disclose 
the threat to freedom of speech inherent in its existence. It 
cannot be thought to differ in any material respect from the 
statute held void in Thornhill's case. The carrying of signs 
and banners, no less than the raising of a flag, is a natural 
and appropriate means of conveying information on matters 
of public concern. (Stromberg v. Oalifornia, 283 U. S. 359 
[51 S. Ct. 532, 75 L. Ed. 1117, 73 A. L. R. 1484].) For 
the reasons set forth in our opinion in Thornhill v. Alabama, 
supra, publicizing the facts of a labor dispute in a peaceful 
way through appropriate means, whether by pamphlet, by 
word of mouth or by banner, must now be regarded as within 
that liberty of communication which is secured to every per-
son by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgement by a 
state. " 
In reviewing the decisions of the Supreme Court of the 
United States in connection with my study of the case at bar 
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and the preparation of this opinion, I have been strongly 
impressed with the decided liberal trend of the decisions of 
that great court, which in its pronouncements in the field of 
those fundamental and basic personal rights and liberties re-
ferred to as civil liberties, have exemplified profound vision 
and foresight and eminent fairness in extending the consti-
tutional guaranties of freedom of speech and of tne press 
not only the strong, the wealthy and the powerful, but like- . 
wise the weak, the humble and the oppressed. It is these 
pronouncements which will protect a defenseless minority 
from being legislated against and their freedom of expression 
curtailed by those who happen to be in the majority or who 
control the legislative processes for the time being. Such a 
situation was depicted by Mr. Justice Murphy in speaking 
for the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of 
Thornhill v. Alabama, supra, when he said: 
"A like threat is inherent in a penal statute, like that in 
question here, which does not aim specifically at evils within 
the allowable area of State control but, on the contrary, 
sweeps within its ambit other activities that in ordinary cir-
cumstances constitute an exercise of freedom of speech or 
of the press. The existence of stwh a statute, which readily 
lends itself to harsh and discriminatory enforcement by local 
prosecuting officials, against particular groups deemed to 
merit their displeasure, res1,(,lts in a continuous and pervasive 
restraint on all freedom of discussion that might reasonably 
be regarded as within its pttrview. It is not any less effective 
or, if the restraint is not permissible, less pernicious than the 
restraint on freedom of discussion imposed by the threat of 
censorship. An accused, after arrest and conviction under 
such a statute, does not have to sustain the burden of demon-
strating that the State could not constitutionally have written 
a different and specific statute covering his activities as dis-
closed by the charge and the evidence introduced against him. 
(Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 155, 162, 163 [60 S. Ct. 
146, 84 L. Ed. 155].) Where regulations of the liberty of 
free discussion are concerned, there are special reasons for 
observing the rule that it is the statute, and not the accusa-
tion or the evidence under it, which prescribes the limits of 
permissible conduct and warns against transgression. (Strom-
berg v. Oa.lifornia, 283 U. S. 359, 368 [51 S. Ct. 532, 75 L. 
Ed. 1117, 73 A. L. R. 1484]; Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 
147, 155, 162, 163 [60 S. Ct. 146, 84 L. Ed. 155].) Compare 
'J 
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Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451 [59 S. Ct. 618, 83 
L. Ed. 888]." (Emphasis added.) 
So zealously has the Supreme Court of the United States 
guarded and protected these fundamental personal rights and 
liberties that in the case of Schneider v. State, supra, that 
court struck down as unconstitutional and void four ordi-
nances enacted respectively by the cities of Los Angeles, 
California, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Worcester, Massachusetts, 
and Irvington, New Jersey, designed to prohibit the distri-
bution of handbills, leaflets, circulars, etc., in said cities. Mr. 
Justice Roberts, speaking for the court in said case, .declared: 
"It is argued that the circumstance that in the actual en-
forcement of the Milwaukee ordinance the distributor is 
arrested only if those who receive the literature throw it in 
the streets, renders it valid. But, even as thus construed, the 
ordinance cannot be enforced without unconstitutionally 
abridging the liberty of free speech. As we have pointed out, 
the public convenience in respect of clea:r;tliness of the streets 
does not justify an exertion of the police power which in-
vades the free communication of information and opinion 
secured by the Constitution. 
"It is suggested that the Los Angeles and Worcester ordi-
nances are valid because their operation is limited to streets 
and alleys and leaves persons free to distribute printed mat-
ter in other public places. But, as we have said, the streets 
are natural and proper places for the dissemination of infor-
mation and opinion; and one is not to have the exercise of 
his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on 
the plea that it maybe exercised in some other place. 
, 'The freedom of speech and o.f the press secured by the 
First Amendment against abridgment by the United States 
is similarly secured to all persons by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment against abridgment by a state. 
"Although a municipality may enact regulations in the 
interest of the public safety, health, welfare or convenience, 
these may not abridge the individual liberties secured by the 
Constitution to those who wish to speak, write, print or circu-
late information or opinion. . .. 
, 'This court has characterized the freedom of speech and 
that of the press as fundamental personal rights ,and liberties. 
The phrase is not an empty one and was not lightly used. 
It reflects the belief of the framers ()~ the Constitution that 
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exercise of the rights lies at the foundation of free govern-
ment by free men. It stresses, as do many opinions of this 
court, the importance of preventing the restriction of enjoy-
ment of these liberties. 
"In every case, therefore, where legislative abridgment of 
the rights is asserted, the courts should be astute to examine 
the effect of the challenged legislation. Mere legislative pref-
erences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience 
may well support regulation directed at other personal activi-
ties, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exer-
cise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic insti-
tutions. And so, as cases arise, the delicate and difficult task 
falls upon the courts to weigh the circumstances and to ap-
praise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support 
of the regulation of the free enjoyment of the rights." 
The chief contention of the prosecuting officers in the case 
at bar is that the ordinance here in question may be upheld 
as a valid exercise of police power . While the realm within 
which the police power operates may be somewhat indefinite, 
it may not be invoked to abridge the fundamental right of 
freedom of expression guaranteed by constitutional mandate. 
The Constitution is the b.ulwark or our civil liberty and it 
should be so construed as to protect that liberty against 
encroachment even under the guise of the police power. While 
some of its provisions have at times been emasculated by 
enthusiastic advocates of the police power doctrine, the Con-
stitution still remains the fundamental law of the land and 
will continue to be such so long as the ideal of civil liberty is 
predominate in the hearts and minds of the American people. 
In my opinion, the ordinance here in question trenches upon 
the right of free expression guaranteed by both our state and 
federal Constitutions, and should therefore be stricken down. 
If "picketing" means "the dissemination of information con-
cerning the facts of a labor dispute," then the right to picket, 
as well as the right to preach, lecture, teach, or publish a 
newspaper,all fall in the same category. If the Constitution 
protects one of these rights, it protects the others. If a crime 
is committed by a person while exercising one or more of these 
rights, he may be prosecuted, convicted and punished for the 
crime, not for the exercise of the right to picket, preach, 
lecture, teach, or publish a newspaper. In my opinion, any 
legislative enactment designed to abridge or limit any of the 
above-mentioned rights flies squarely in the face of the con. 
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stitutional guarantee of· freedom of speech and press, and 
should be declared null and void by the courts under their 
constitutional power. 
From what I have said in the foregoing opinion, it is obvious 
that section 3 as well as section 2 of the ordinance here under 
consideration is void, and there can be no doubt but that 
habeas corpus is the only remedy available to petitioners to 
test the validity of said ordinance. (See cases collected and 
commented on in 13 Cal. Jur. p. 225, sec. 8.) 
In view of my determination that the ordinance is invalid 
and void because the language employed therein is too vague, 
uncertain and indefinite to provide a sufficiently ascertainable 
standard of guilt and that the acts denounced by it cannot be 
proscribed because they are not within the· purview of the 
police power of the state, the complaint therefore fails to 
charge a public offense, and it is unnecessary to review the 
evidence presen"ted during the trial in the justice's court. 
The majority opinions in this case are predicated upon the 
theory that since section 3 of the ordinance in question pur-
ports to prohibit "picketing by means of acts of violence" 
(whatever this phrase means), it defines a crime within the 
purview of the police power of the county of Yuba, and not-
withstanding the defendants were found guilty of violating 
all of the provisions of both sections 2 and 3 of the ordinance 
(a portion of the charge being based on Obviously invalid 
provisions of the ordinance), the judgment against them is 
nevertheless immune from attack on habeas corpus. 
I am of the opinion, that even if it can be said that section 3 
of the ordinance sufficiently defines a crime as held by a 
majority of the court, the conviction of the defendants should 
not be allowed to stand for the reason that the complaint 
which forms the basis of the prosecution is wholly insufficient 
to charge a public offense, and the judgment against peti-
tioners is void for the reason that they were found guilty of 
the commission of lawful as well as unlawful acts. 
Section 3 of the ordinance in question makes unlawful, 
"picketing by means· of compUlsion, coercion, intimidation, 
threats, acts of violence, or fear." All of these means, except 
"acts of violence" may be resorted to by those who are peace-
fully and therefore lawfully engaged in publicizing a labor 
dispute by means of picketing or boycotting. 
That there is such a thing as moral compulsion, coercion, 
intimidation, threats, and fear is a proposition recognized in 
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experience and by many court decisions, and in my opinion, 
these words do not necessarily imply conduct of an unlawful 
character when applied to a labor dispute. Such words may 
be used to define the usual, ordinary and customary moral, 
social and economic pressure which inheres in every labor 
dispute and particularly where picketing is resorted to. 
It must be conceded that it is within the constitutional right 
of a person engaged in a labor dispute to advise those who 
contemplate crossing a picket line, that if they do so, future 
social or business relations with them will be withheld. It 
must also be conceded that such advice constitutes a threat, 
and it also amounts to compulsion, intimidation and coercion. 
Such compulSIon, intimidation and coercion is the result of 
fear of the· withholding of such social or business relations 
which may have been both pleasant and profitable to the 
person who is threatened with the loss thereof. Obviously, 
conduct constituting such threats, compulsion, intimidation, 
coercion or fear cannot be proscribed by penal statute or ordi-
nance for the reason that the same would constitute a violation 
of the constitutional guarantee of free speech. 
Webster's New International Dictionary, Second Edition, 
defines "compulsion" as follows: 
, '1. Act of compelling, or state of being compelled; act of 
driving or urging by force or by physical or moral constraint; 
SUbjection to force. Cf. Coercion. 
"I would give no man a reason upon compulsion." 
"2. Anything that compels; as, to live under compulsion." 
The same work defines" coercion" as follows: 
"1. The act, process, or power of coercing; specif., the appli-
cation to another of such force, either physical or moral, as 
to constrain him to do against his will something he would not 
otherwise have done; compulsion. Coercion may cause the act 
produced to bea nullity so far as concerns legal ability. 
Cf. Duress. 
"2. The application of legal or governmental measures to a 
group or nation, so as to bring its outward conformity." 
And "intimidation" is defined by the same work as follows: 
, 'To make timid or fearful; to inspire or affect with fear; 
to make fearful; to frighten; specif., to deter, as by threats; 
to overawe; cow. 
"Now guilt, once harbored in a conscious breast, 
"Intimidates the brave, degrades the great. Johnson. 
"Syn.-Terrify, daunt, deter, abash. See Frighten. 
,., 
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"Ant.-Embolden, hearten, inspirit. See Encourage. 
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" Act of making timid or fearful or of deterring by threats; 
state of being intimidated, as the voters were kept from the 
polls by intimidation." 
It will be observed from the foregoing definitions that the 
mere assertion that compulsion, coercion or intimidation has 
been used or resorted to for the accomplishment of an object 
or purpose or in the performance of an act, it does not neces-
sarily follow therefrom that the means employed was unlawful, 
immoral or unjust. In fact, it is inconceivable that a labor 
dispute could result in a strike, and that striking employees 
and their sympathizers could picket and boycott places of 
business, without the owners, employees or patrons of such 
places of business being subjected to some degree of moral, 
social or economic compulsion, coercion or intimidation. It 
appears to be settled beyond any question by the authorities 
which I have cited above, and by many other authorities both 
in this and other jurisdictions, that the moral, social and 
economic compulsion, coercion and intimidation which may be 
occasioned as the result of peaceful picketing, boycotting and 
publicizing of labor disputes, cannot be proscribed by statute 
or prohibited by injunction because 'Such conduct is permis-
sible as a lawful exercise of the constitutional right of free 
speech, free press and free assemblage. 
What is said with reference to the meaning of the words 
"compulsion," "coercion" and" intimidation" when applied 
to peaceful picketing and boycotting, is equally true with 
reference to the word "threat." It cannot be denied that a 
person has the right to threaten that which he has a lawful 
right to do, and that such threat cannot be proscribed by 
statute or ordinance, or prohibited by injunction. The late 
Mr. Justice Holmes, while a member of the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts, in the case of V egelahn v. Gunther, 
167 IVlass. 92 [44 N. E. 1077, 57 Am. St. Rep. 443, 35 L. R. A. 
722], made this observation in one of his history-making dis~ 
senting opinions. He said: 
"I pause here to remark that the word 'threats' often is 
used as if, when it appeared that threats had been made, it 
appeared that unlawful conduct had begun. But it depends 
on what you threaten. As a general rule, even if subject to 
some exceptions, what you may do in a certain event you may 
threaten to do-that is. give warning of your intention to do-
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in that event, and thus allow the other person the chance of 
avoiding the consequence. So as to 'compulsion,' it depends 
on how you 'compel' ... So as to 'annoyance' or 'intimida-
tion.' ." 
In the case of Lisse v. Local Union No. 31, 2 Cal. (2d) 312 
[41 Pac. (2d) 314], at page 318, this court quoted with 
approval from its decision in the case of Pierce v. Stablemen's 
Union, 156 Cal. 70 [103 Pac. 324], as follows: 
" 'The right of united labor to strike, in furtherance of 
trade interests (no contractual obligation standing in the way) 
is fully recognized. The reason for the strike may be based 
upon the refusal to comply with the employees' demand for 
the betterment of wages, conditions, hours of labor, in the 
discharge of one employee, or the engagement of another-in 
brief, in anyone or more of the multifarious considerations 
which in good faith may be believed to tend toward the ad-
vancement of the employees. After striking, the employees 
may engage in a boycott, as that word is here employed. As 
here employed it means not only the right to the concerted 
withdrawal of social and business intercourse, but the right 
by all legitimate means-of fair publication, and fair oral or 
written persuasion, to induce others interested in or sym-
pathetic with their cause, to withdraw their social intercourse 
and business patronage from the employer. They may go even 
further than this, and request of another that he withdraw his 
patronage from the employer, and may 1lse the moral intimi-
dation and coercion of threatening a like boycott aga1:nst . him 
if he ref'i,lse so to do. This last proposition necessarily involves 
the bringing into a labor dispute between A and B, C, who 
has no difference with either. It contemplates that C, upon 
the request of B, and under the moral intimidation lest B 
boycott him, may thus be constrained to withdraw his patron-
age from A, with whom he has no controversy." (Emphasis 
added.) 
In the case of Parkinson Co. v. Building Trades Oouncil, 
154 Cal. 581,610 [98 Pac. 1027, 16 Ann. Cas. 1165,21 L. R. A. 
(N. S.) 550], Mr. Justice Sloss in his concurring opinion 
quoted with approval from the dissenting opinion of the late 
Mr. Justice Holmes, in the case of Vegelahn v. Gunther, s'/,{,pra, 
as follows: 
" 'If it be true that workingmen may combine with a view, 
among other things, to getting as much as they can for their 
labor, just as capital may combine with a view to getting the 
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greatest possible return, it must be true that when combined 
they have the same liberty that combined capital has to sup-
port their interests by argument, persuasion, and the bestowal 
or refusal of those advantages which they otherwise lawfully 
control. ' 
"The terms' intimidation' and' coercion, ' so frequently used 
in the discussion of this question,seem to me to have no appli-
cation to such acts as were here committed. One cannot be 
said to be 'intimidated' or 'coerced,' in the sense of unlawful 
compUlsion, by being induced to forego business relations with 
A, rather than lose the benefit of more profitable relations 
with B. It is equally beside the question to speak of 'threats,' 
where that which is threatened is only what the party has a 
legal right to do." 
The Supreme Court of Indiana, in the case of Local Union 
No. 26 etc. v. City of Kokomo, 211 Ind .. 72 [5 N. E. (2d) 624, 
at page 628, 108 A. L. R. 1111], discusses the meaning of the 
words "compulsion" and "coercion" in relation to a labor 
dispute in the. following language: 
, 'The city ordinance now before the court makes all picket-
ing of the employer's premises, or the approach thereto, un-
lawful. No force or violence is necessary to make the act of 
picketing unlawful and punishable. Peaceable acts upon the 
part of the employees are authorized expressly by chapter 12 
of the Acts of 1933. The allegations of the complaint show 
no acts involving fraud or violence. The 1933 act authorizes 
the doing of all acts alleged in the complaint, which alleges 
that such acts were performed by lawful means and without 
fraud or violence, or any intention or purpose to injure the 
employer. The act of striking or picketing necessarily in-
volves compulsion and coercion, and unless the same is per-
formed by acts of fraud or violence, is lawful and permissible 
under .the statute. 
"The act of picketing is a means of 'compulsion and co-
ercion,' but if it is exercised in a legal manner, and without 
fraud or violence, it is lawful under the statute, yet it is the 
clear intention of the ordinance to prevent such acts. The 
overt act of assembling and congregating for concerted action 
in a peaceable, lawful manner is made punishable by the ordi. 
nance. The ordinance is repugnant to the declared purpose 
and object of the statute." 
I think the foregoing authorities clearly hold that to some 
extent moral, social and economic compulsion, coercion and 
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intimidation inheres in every labor dispute where picketing 
Rnd boycotting is resorted to by striking employees and their 
sympathizers, and that such compulsion, coercion and intim-
idation, so long as it is exercised without fraud, force or vio-
lence, does not transcend the realm of peaceful picketing, and 
cannot be proscribed by statute or ordinance. This conclu-
sion is sustained by the trend of recent decisions, particularly 
those of the Supreme Court of the United States, which I 
have cited herein. The clear purport of these decisions is' to 
the effect that any statute or ordinance which proscribes or 
prohibits peaceful picketing is in clear violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 
Of course, it is elementary that a person engaged in picket-
ing is amenable to all of our penal statutes denouncing as 
crimes all acts of force, violence, menacing threats, riots, 
routs, disturbing of the peace, unlawful assembly, assault 
and battery, etc., and my attention has not been called to any 
acts which one engaged in picketing might perpetrate in vio-
lation of the civil rights of another, or inimical to public 
peace and safety, which are not now denounced as crimes by 
the penal statutes of this state and punishable as such. 
The complaint against petitioners follows the language of 
the ordinance and the petitioners were charged as follows: 
"That on or about the 9th day of July, 1939, and within 
the limits of the County of Yuba, in the State of California, 
said defendants did then and there wilfully and unlawfully 
beset and/or picket the premises and/or the approach thereto 
of another, to-wit, the Earl Fruit Company located approxi-
mately seven miles southwest of the City of Marysville, in 
the County of Yuba, State of Oalifornia, and commonly 
known as the New England Ranch where persons were em-
ployed and/or sought employment, for the purpose of induc-
ing such employees and/or persons seeking employment by 
means of compulsion, and/or coercion and/or intimidation 
and/or threats and/or acts of violence and/or to quit his or 
her employment and/or to refrain from seeking or freely en-
tering into said employment." 
It appears to be well settled that where a' statute is so 
framed that lawful as well as unlawful acts may be punished 
under it, a complaint charging a violation of the law must 
specifically set out the alleged unlawful conduct of the 
accused, and negative lawful conduct on his part. Otherwise, 
a complaint under such a law fails to charge a public offense, 
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which is the situation we have in the case at bar. (Ex parte 
Peterson, 119 Cal. 578 [51 Pac. 859] ; Ex parte McLaughlin, 
16 Cal. App. 270 [116 Pac. 684] ; In re Hernandez, 64 Cal. 
App. 71 [220 Pac. 423].) 
Tested by the rule announced in the foregoing authorities, 
the complaint in the case at bar was clearly insufficient to 
charge the petitioners with the commission of a public offense. 
As I have heretofore pointed out, the ordinance is clearly 
invalid in so far as it purports to denounce as a public offense 
picketing by meaIis of compulsion, coercion, or intimidation 
as such words are defined in the authorities relating to pick-
eting cases. Such being the case, the complaint against peti-
tioners charges them with the doing of lawful as well as 
unlawful acts, and is therefore insufficient to charge a public 
offense and is insufficient to support a judgment of conviction 
against petitioners for a violation of section 3 of said ordi-
nance. 
Furthermore, the complaint in the case at bar charges both 
in the conjunctive and disjunctive the violation of every act 
denounced by section 3 of the ordinance. This method of 
pleading is clearly improper. It is impossible to d~termine 
from such a complaint what ~pecific acts or conduct of the 
defendants the prosecution intends to prove for the purpose 
of establishing their guilt. Under the complaint in this case, 
the defendants could have. been found guilty of a violation of 
section 3 of said ordinance if they did nothing more than 
stand on the side of the road peacefully holding. a piece of 
cardboard in their hands containing a statement that a labor 
dispute was in progress on the adjacent premises. Such a 
complaint is clearly insufficient to charge a public offense, and 
may be tested on habeas corpus. (Ex parte Greenall, 153 Cal. 
767 [96 Pac. 804]; In re A.h Sing; 156 Cal. 349 [104 Pac. 
448] .) 
- The trial court made no attempt to segregate the charges in 
the complaint charging an alleged unlawful offense from those 
charging the commission of purely lawful acts. This is dem-
onstrated not only by the allegations of the petition, but also 
by those of the return. Both allege that the jury found the 
defendants guilty "as charged in the complaint," and that 
the sentence imposed was imposed "on said conviction." I 
think it is clear that such a complaint could not authorize the 
trial court to try the accused for acts which are lawful, nor 
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could it confer jurisdiction on the trial court to convict the 
accused for the doing of lawful acts, and to sentence them for 
the doing of such lawful acts. That is exactly what was done 
in the instant case. The defendants were found guilty "as 
charged in the complaint" and sentence was imposed" on said 
conviction. " That means that the jury found that the defen-
dants were guilty of all the" offenses" charged in the com-
plaint, including those predicated upon those portions of the 
statute which are admittedly unconstitutional. It also means 
that the sentence was partially predicated on the unconsti-
tutional portions of the statute. It certainly needs no citation 
of authority to establish the proposition that a trial court has 
no jurisdiction to enter a judgment convicting an accused of 
acts which are lawful. Petitioners have exhausted the only 
other remedy available to them, namely, an appeal. On that 
appeal the constitutionality of the statute was in issue, and 
the court to which the appeal was taken had jurisdiction to 
reverse the judgment of conviction and retry the case upon 
issues raised by a plea of not guilty of the unlawful act 
charged. Since this is so, habeas corpus is now the only 
remedy available to petitioners. 
On a habeas corpus proceeding the only question involved 
is one of jurisdiction, namely, did the court below have the 
lawful authority to make or issue the particular order, judg-
ment or process under attack. (See the many cases from the 
United States Supreme Court, California Supreme Court and 
other state courts collected and commented on in 22 Am. Jur. 
159, sec. 26; 13 Cal. Jur. 222, sec. 7.) All courts are agreed 
on this point. . While there is some confusion in the cases as 
to the meaning of the term" jurisdiction," as used in habeas 
corpus proceedings, the overwhelming weight of authority is 
to the effect that the term includes more than the question as 
to whether the trial court had jurisdiction over the person and 
subject matter. It is now settled that jurisdiction over the 
person and subject matter is not alone conclusive, but that the 
jurisdiction of the court to make or render the order or judg-
ment that serves as the basis of the imprisonment is a proper 
subject of inquiry. Stated another way, jurisdiction to render 
the particular order or judgment in question is deemed as 
essential as is jurisdiction of the person or subject matter. 
(See cases collected and commented on in 22 Am. Jur. 161, 
sec. 27; 76 A. L.R. 469.) 
Moreover, it must be remembered that petitioners were con-
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victed in an inferior court and not by a superior court. As to 
such courts, no presumption will be indulged as to the regu-
larity of the proceedings therein. ' It has been consistently 
held that, as to justice's courts, nothing will be presumed in 
favor of their jurisdiction. (Antilla v. Justice's Oourt, 209 
Cal. 621 [290 Pac. 43], and numerous other authorities cited 
in the foot note to 6 Cal. Jur. 10 Yr. Supp. 611, sec. 85.) 
Even if it be conceded,. as erroneously held in the maj ority 
opinions, that there is a presumption of regularity of the 
proceedings in a justice's court, there is no basis for the appli-
cation of such a rule here, for the reason that it affirmativetY 
and conclusively appears on the face of the record itself that 
petitioners were charged, convicted and sentenced for the com-
mission of acts which both this court and the Supreme Court 
of the United States have held to be beyond the power of the 
state or its political subdivisions to proscribe. 
Tested by these standards, and, keeping in mind the fact 
that the convictions were here had in an inferior court, the 
judgment of conviction is subject to collateral attack on habeas 
corpus. The trial court, although it may have had jurisdiction 
of the person and subject matter, had no jurisdiction to con-
vict and sentence the petitioners for offenses based wholly or 
in part 0n an unconstitutional statute. While it is true that 
habeas corpus will not always issue where other remedies are 
available, it is settled that habeas corpus properly may be used 
to test the constitutionality of a statute (see cases collected 
and cpmmented on in 13 Cal. Jur. 225, sec. 8), and that the 
fact that a remedy by appeal may exist is not a complete bar 
to the proceeding. Certainly, where, as in this case, the peti-
tioners appeal and raise the question of the constitutionality 
of the statute on such appeal, and, where the court to which 
the appeal is taken has complete jurisdiction to pass on the 
question, hut, nevertheless affirms the invalid judgment, habeas 
corpus is available. 
A writ of habeas corpus should therefore be granted and the 
petitioners discharged from custody. 
Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied March 
12, 1942~ Carter, J., voted for a rehearing. 
